July 25, 2020

Erdogan’s Kurdish Gambit


By openDemocracy

Jerusalem Post, 17/5

On May 8th, fighters of the Kurdish PKK militia began to withdraw from their positions in Turkey, bound for their mountain strongholds in Kurdish-ruled northern Iraq. The decision by the PKK to withdraw is the result of orders issued by jailed movement leader Abdullah Ocalan. The re-energizing of the Turkish-Kurdish ‘peace process’ is one of the most important of the phenomena generated by the seismic shifts currently under way in the Middle East. But the foundations of this process are far more shaky than the guerrillas’ redeployment from Turkey would suggest.

The newly minted Turkish-Kurdish peace process resembles the veteran Israeli-Palestinian version in a number of ways. Perhaps most importantly, the process has been launched without any clear picture of how it is supposed to conclude. There is no evidence of any ‘historic compromise’ between the sides on the core issues which caused the conflict in the first place.

For the Kurdish side, the struggle is no longer about separate statehood. Rather, their demands now center on the right to use Kurdish language in education, equal status of Kurds in the Turkish constitution, greater autonomy for local authorities in Kurdish majority areas, and the release of thousands of Kurdish political prisoners held in Turkish jails.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayepp Erdogan has committed himself on none of these issues. For him, the existence of the process appears more important than its result. Erdogan’s Kurdish gambit is intended to form part of his broader campaign to transform the Turkish polity.

Starting in September 2008, representatives of the Turkish state and of the PKK engaged in intermittent face to face talks in the Norwegian capital, Oslo. From August 2009, the Turkish side were led by Hakan Fidan, a close associate of Erdogan who now heads the MIT, the Turkish National Intelligence Association. Parallel talks between MIT representatives and PKK leader Ocalan also took place at Imrali, the island jail where Ocalan has been incarcerated for the last fourteen years.

From the outset, Kurds suspected that the Turkish intention of the talks was to induce the PKK to end its insurgency, for the sake of the process, while offering no concrete path for solving the conflict. As a result, recent years have been marked by long ceasefires and periodic bursts of conflict as the Kurds sought to remind the Turks that the quiet should not be taken for granted, for as long as the core issues remained unresolved.

So what was the breakthrough which has led to the current appearance of progress? From late 2012, the Turkish government began a new round of talks with Ocalan alone, on Imrali, denying the PKK the possibility of presenting a coherent stance as a movement. This process has led to the orders by Ocalan for the withdrawal of PKK fighters and the appearance of progress. But what exactly the government has or has not proposed on Imrali remains shrouded in mystery. Nothing in writing has emerged from the Imrali talks, on any of the core issues of the conflict.

While Ocalan retains an iconic status within the PKK and parts of the broader Kurdish world, it is not difficult to discern caution and some confusion among movement cadres regarding their leaders’ latest orders.

In an interview this week with renowned Turkish journalist Hasan Cemal, prominent PKK commander Bahoz Erdal stressed that the current PKK decision for a ceasefire does not imply surrender, nor remove the possibility of a return to armed action if the Kurdish issue remains unresolved. “They asked for a cease fire – we declared. They asked for withdrawal, we are doing this now. If tomorrow they ask that this is not enough, you should lay down your arms – they can’t force us to do this. This means surrender for us which we (the PKK) have never accepted, even in the most difficult times,” Erdal told Cemal.

The point, Erdal said, was not a ceasefire for its own sake, but to remove the reasons why Kurds took up the guerrilla struggle in the first place.

The veteran PKK fighter also noted that the Turkish army has begun to construct a new infrastructure along the border, intended to hinder the ability of Kurdish fighters to return into Turkey should the conflict continue. This observation is part of a broader concern in the PKK that Erdogan’s intention may be to neutralize and distance the movement and render it irrelevant, rather than to reach a true rapprochement with it.

Erdal is a very prominent commander, well respected among the Kurds, and his statements will be carefully studied by all sides.

Murat Karayilan, the de facto leader of the PKK in Qandil, said that the withdrawal from Turkey would ‘stop immediately if there is any attack, operation or bombing of our guerrilla forces, and our forces will use their right to reciprocate.’

Karayilan also made clear in a rare press conference at the end of April that PKK disarmament would take place only after the Turkish government carried out constitutional amendments in line with the movement’s demands relating to Kurdish rights.

Serious questions therefore remain as to whether the peace process will in the end bear fruit.

From Erdogan’s point of view, however, the move towards the Kurds makes obvious political sense. The Turkish prime minister’s current central goal is to ensure the passing of a constitution which would radically re-shape the nature of the Turkish republic. Most importantly, the new constitution will replace the current parliamentary system with a presidential one. This will then pave the way for Erdogan himself to stand in presidential elections in 2014, and rule with vastly increased executive powers.

Many in Turkey fear that at this point, Erdogan will complete the process of a Putin-style hollowing out of Turkish democracy which they discern is already under way – in the emasculation of the free media, the jailing of senior officers on trumped up charges and the incarceration and harassment of journalists.

To bring the constitution to a referendum, Erdogan needs a 330 seat majority in the 550 member parliament in order to bring the constitution to a referendum. He currently controls 325 seats.

One of the ways in which Erdogan could ensure his majority would be by securing the support of the Kurdish BDP (Peace and Democracy Party.) Many observers adiscern the central goal in Erdogan’s current peace process as being to secure BDP and Kurdish support for the new constitution.

This brings with it the possibility that once the new constitution is in place and Erdogan securely ensconced as president, he could abandon the perhaps impossible task of reconciling Turkish and Kurdish desires, leaving a neutered PKK, and reverting to the previous policies of repression.

Should the peace process falter, however, Erdogan will need to take account of a strikingly improved Kurdish strategic position. Perhaps most importantly of all, a franchise of the PKK now controls north-east Syria. Kurdish fighters resisted a Turkish backed attempt by Syrian rebels to begin a re-conquest of this area in January. There is also a flourishing de facto sovereign area in the Iraqi Kurdish region (which is not, of course, aligned with the PKK).

So Erdogan has launched an audacious gamble, initiated with the help of the ever-eager diplomats of Norway. PKK leader Ocalan, meanwhile, has reportedly said that if the process fails, 70,000 fighters await his orders. Whether Erdogan’s move will result in a lasting rapprochement between Turks and Kurds – or flounder into renewed conflict – remains very much to be seen.

via Jonathan Spyer’s blog 

About Jonathan Spyer

Dr. Jonathan Spyer is a senior research fellow at the Global Research in International Affairs Center in Herzliya, Israel, and a fellow at the Middle East Forum. He is the author of The Transforming Fire: The Rise of the Israel-Islamist Conflict (Continuum, 2010) and a columnist at the Jerusalem Post newspaper. Spyer holds a PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics and a Masters' Degree in Middle East Politics from the School of Oriental and African Studies in London. His blog can be followed at: http://jonathanspyer.com/.