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There's no question that the Obama administration is less warm toward Israel than those of Clinton, Reagan, or George W. Bush's first six years. But is it worse than the late George W. or all the Bush I and Jimmy Carter administrations? We're about to find out.

The bottom line is that the basis of the relationship is still secure in no small part because each side wants-and can get-something from the other. Israel says: you want us to cooperate on Palestinians? You cooperate on Iran. The United States says the same thing, albeit in the opposite order.  And both sides understand this.

Much to the contrary has been claimed without much evidence, based on Obama's cool-toward-Israel background and his eagerness to engage radical forces; wishful thinking in anti-Israel media; and hatred of Obama in some pro-Israel circles.

Often, the administration is blamed or credited with breaking new ground when it's simply repeating predecessors' positions. A U.S. government favoring a two-state solution (it's a pity the Palestinians don't also do so), opposing settlements, or proclaiming it will solve the conflict real fast isn't new. The widespread claim that the administration threatened Israel's nuclear arsenal is also wrong, based on a general statement that everyone should join the Non-Proliferation Treaty which was actually aimed at justifying a current U.S. nuclear deal with India.

Posturing and pretending is a far bigger factor than real pressure against Israel. U.S. officials supposedly said progress on Iranian nuclear weapons depends on progress in the peace process. This is simply a way to leverage minimal Israeli cooperation on the peace process. After all, will the administration try harder or less hard on Iran depending on whether the peace process advances? Obviously not. And neither Israel nor the Palestinians will give more concessions to each other if Iran's nuclear program slows down.

The other thing going on here is the administration's search for easy victories. U.S. officials will say: "That hardline Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wanted to build dozens of settlements while refusing to talk to Palestinians or accept a two-state solution, but we sure showed him how to behave!" When in fact, Netanyahu would have done precisely the same things without any supposed pressure.

Of course, when the administration tries to get the Arab states or Palestinian leadership to do anything, that's when its problems begin. And nothing whatsoever of great significance will happen in the peace process.

Still, the administration will be able to tell the American public: "We said we'd succeed in making advances and we've done so!"

Yes, that's how politics and diplomacy works.

Basically, the administration wants Netanyahu to act as prime minister about the same as Tsipi Livni or Ehud Barak, leader of the two other main parties, would. The "pressure" will not be to make big concessions but rather not to raise demands too high.

Netanyahu and his team are not foolish or-as a group-extremist. Their program, though somewhat tougher than that of their predecessor, is not all that different and is certainly something the U.S. government can accept.

 There's been much nonsense about Netanyahu government positions. He's not going to annex territory or stop negotiating, or condition talks on accepting Israel as a Jewish state or eliminating Iran's nuclear weapons' program. He won't attack Iran next week or reject the magical words: "two-state solution."

 What he will do-backed by Defense Minister and Labor party leader Barak-is to assert that Israel will only make concessions if it received concessions. For example, the Road Map, which Netanyahu endorses and both the administration and EU reverses, puts obligations on the PA which Israel wants to see met.

 Contrary to breathless insistence on imminent success, the Obama administration doesn't believe it's going to get a comprehensive solution soon. Nor is it going to bash Israel, break completely with historic U.S. policy, or go soft on Hamas.

 Does this mean there are no problems? No and here's a list:

 --U.S. policy toward Iran is too soft and unintentionally encourages Tehran to be more aggressive. Efforts at engagement will slow down tougher sanctions and increases the likelihood that one day Israel will have to choose between attacking or watching Iran get nuclear weapons. If Israel were to attack, it could not expect support by the Obama administration (but the same was true, though less so, for Bush).

 --U.S. policy toward Syria is leading Damascus to believe it can get away with murder.

 --The Obama administration isn't energetic enough on Lebanon which means that Syria and Iran will possibly make a big gain in the election there. If the radicals win in Lebanon, U.S. policy might deal with a government in which Hizballah is a leading member, though administration officials insist this won't happen.

 --Being less warm toward Israel overall the Obama administration will be less forthcoming on some key military equipment and less likely to brief and coordinate with Israeli leaders. (Though this administration which talks so much about multilateralism doesn't seem to be doing these things with Britain either.)

 --When facing a Middle East crisis which affects Israeli interests directly or indirectly, can the Obama administration be depended on to have the understanding, determination, and toughness to handle it well?

 --Given the cooler attitude to Israel, there can all manner of minor pinpricks and frictions which have no lasting or major impact but create short-term difficulties.

 In direct terms, however, the supposedly "hardline" Netanyahu and allegedly "Israel-hating" (albeit certainly not Israel-loving) Obama may get along better than predicted.

 Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), with Walter Laqueur (Viking-Penguin); the paperback edition of The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan); A Chronological History of Terrorism, with Judy Colp Rubin, (Sharpe); and The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley). To read and subscribe to MERIA, GLORIA articles, or to order books, go to http://www.gloria-center.org. His blog, Rubin Reports is at http://rubinreports.blogspot.com/