December 28, 2020



PDF version available here

Antisemitic graffiti, New York, 2012.

Antisemitic graffiti, New York, 2012.

At just the right moment in global history, the Anti-Defamation League[1] of the B’nai Brith organization[2] has released new data on antisemitism in over 100 countries.[3] This data is based on solid opinion surveys and for the first time includes large parts of the Muslim world, not only Western countries.[4] This article presents these data with rankings and maps and then examines some of the most important implications of these data, including possible drivers of contemporary antisemitism, in understandable, everyday language.  The goal of this statistical analysis was to ascertain whether antisemitic attitudes indeed coincide with structural characteristics or policies of nations around the globe or opinion structures on other issues.




Recent reactions in many countries to events in Gaza may prove to be a watershed in what has been increasingly called a “new antisemitism,”[5] spreading around the globe. Internationally, articles appear every day such as a piece in the London “Daily Telegraph” which appeared on July 26, 2020[6], which describes European cities braced for violent clashes as residents take to the streets to protest Israeli military operations in Gaza.

These protests increasingly target not only representations and symbols of the state of Israel, but Judaism itself. The Telegraph article states that in recent weeks over the summer of 2014, protesters in France attacked synagogues, smashed the windows of Jewish-owned business and torched others, in scenes the Daily Telegraph called “disturbingly reminiscent of the 1938 Kristallnacht.” Some marchers even chanted “Jews to the gas chambers.”  Jewish people were attacked on the streets of Germany in Berlin. In Austria, a friendly football match between a French team and Israel’s Maccabi Haifa (a club which includes several prominent Arab Israeli football players) had to be called off after Muslim Austrian protesters stormed the pitch and fought with the players. Former Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, recently elected to the presidency of the NATO member country,[7] whose Foreign Ministry continues to pay lip service to the aims of Western global security, has in turn been accused of whipping up antisemitism among Western Europe’s large Turkish immigrant population with his statement that “Israel has surpassed Hitler in barbarism.” [8]

If your choice of British paper is not the conservative Daily Telegraph, but its liberal/left counterpart, the Guardian-certainly not the kind of newspaper which can be accused of unilaterally siding with the State of Israel-it wrote in its report of August 07, 2020[9], that antisemitism is indeed on the rise across Europe “in the worst times since the Nazi era.” In only a single week, it says, eight synagogues were attacked in France. The synagogue in the Paris suburb of Sarcelles was fire-bombed by a 400-strong mob. A kosher supermarket and a pharmacy were smashed and looted; the crowd’s chants and banners included “Death to Jews” and “Slit Jews’ throats.” Molotov cocktails were thrown into the Bergische synagogue in Wuppertal in Germany as well, a synagogue previously destroyed in a pogrom in 1938. A German Muslim Imam, Abu Bilal Ismail even called on Allah to “destroy the Zionist Jews … Count them and kill them, to the very last one.”[10] Slogans during pro-Hamas demonstrations included: “Jew, coward pig, come out and fight alone,” and “Hamas, Hamas, Jews to the gas.”

This surely represents a radical shift from the days when Europe seemed to be finally on its way to overcoming the demons of antisemitism! What a change in the mood of the times, compared to the spirits of the 1960s, when the Vatican’s Nostra Aetate, according to many theologians, laid to rest the theological foundations of Christian antisemitism for good.[11]

Confronted with these contemporary developments, Germany Chancellor, Angela Merkel, has called these recent incidents in the midst of Europe “an attack on freedom and tolerance and our democratic state.”[12] French Prime Minister, Manuel Valls, has spoken out equally forcefully against these “intolerable” and clearly antisemitic acts: “To attack a Jew because he is a Jew is to attack France. To attack a synagogue and a kosher grocery store is quite simply antisemitism and racism.”[13]

As such alarming events and attitudes spread through Europe, it is nevertheless clear to social scientists that this “new” antisemitism is not so new after all.

Based on quantitative analyses of opinion survey data, Edward H. Kaplan and Charles A. Small already proved in the Journal of Conflict Resolution almost a decade ago[14], that the more extreme criticisms of Israel (for example, that Israel is an apartheid state, that the Israel Defense Forces deliberately target Palestinian civilians), coupled with extreme policy proposals (boycotting Israeli academics and institutions, divesting from or sanctions against companies doing business with Israel), are solely motivated by antisemitic sentiments. Surveying 500 participants in each of ten European countries, Kaplan and Small investigated whether individuals with extreme anti-Israel views were more likely to be antisemitic in their general attitudes. Even after statistically controlling for numerous factors, they found that anti-Israel sentiments consistently predicted the probability that an individual was antisemitic, with the likelihood of measured antisemitism increasing with the extent of anti-Israel sentiment observed. A similar study in 2001[15] came to the mathematical-statistical conclusion that complaints about antisemitism in Belgium increased in a statistically significant manner during the Israeli military operation Cast Lead (2008-2009) against Hamas in Gaza. That study drew on a database of complaints to the Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding (Center of Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism), a Belgian anti-racism agency, as well as on analysis of political claims-making in the written press.

Confronting the incapacity, or worse, unwillingness of contemporary academic social science to confront the vitriolic nature of this hatred against Jews, it is worthwhile to remember that this phenomenon is nothing new.  Swiss playwright Max Frisch highlighted as far back as 1952 in his play The Fire Raisers how comfortable it is to look the other way when totalitarian and antisemitic tendencies are on the rise. [16] In the play, arsonists talk their way into a normal citizen’s home. They settle down and eventually destroy the house.  As the destruction unfolds, their victim steadfastly refuses to believe-against all reason-what will happen until his own house is burnt.

A Max Frisch perspective is readily apparent when comparing typical contemporary news items:: in late August of 2014, Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz (an Arab leader who knows indeed what happens in that part of the world) warned on August 29, 2020 that the threat of terrorism will reach Europe and America if the world does not unite to confront the ISIL terrorists in Iraq and Syria, [17] and while the British Prime Minister David Cameron with justification warned against the danger of facing a terrorist state on the shores of the Mediterranean and bordering a NATO member, the New York Times of September 1st 2014 and the liberal-left Vienna daily Der Standard rush to reassure readers that ISIL currently does not threaten the West. The Standard also speculates that the recent Jewish Museum murders in Brussels were not coordinated by ISIL.[18]

The European Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), the EU’s “watchdog” on human rights development, reached similar conclusions to the Kaplan and Small study in 2012, with a report probing Discrimination and hate crime against Jews in EU member states.[19] To metaphorically refer to the Frisch play, the “arsonists” abound, and the FRA survey, the first to collect this type of data antisemitism the EU, gives ample evidence of the types of fuel waiting to accomplish their evil designs. The study was based on a survey of the Jewish population in Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Sweden and the United Kingdom, nations which together contain90 percent of the EU’s Jewish population. The survey was carried out online in September and October 2012, and some 5,900 self-identified Jewish people took part. While the online survey methodology allowed all interested self-identified Jewish people in the survey countries to take part, it did not deliver a random probability sample fulfilling the statistical criteria for representativeness.

Yet despite this statistical limitation, even a cursory glance at some results of that survey is cause for alarm.

  • Two thirds of respondents (66 percent) considered antisemitism to be a problem across the EU member states surveyed. Three quarters of respondents (76 percent) indicated that antisemitism has worsened over the past five years in the country where they live.
  • Overall, 75 percent of respondents considered online antisemitism to be a problem in the country where they live. Almost three quarters of respondents (73 percent) said that antisemitism online has increased over the last five years.
  • In the 12 months before the survey, 26 percent of all respondents experienced an incident or incidents involving verbal insult or harassment because they are Jewish-4 percent experienced physical violence or threats of violence.
  • Almost half (46 percent) of the respondents worried about becoming the victim of an antisemitic verbal insult or harassment in the next 12 months, while one third (33 percent) feared a physical attack in the same period.
  • Close to one quarter (23 percent) of the respondents said that they at least occasionally avoid visiting Jewish events or sites because they would not feel safe there, or on the way there, as a Jew. Over one quarter of all respondents (27 percent) avoided certain places in their local area or neighborhood at least occasionally because they would not feel safe there as a Jew.

In contrast to the “normal citizen,” the victim of Max Frisch’s dark play, the FRA did not look the other way.  It stated that in key EU member countries with large Muslim immigrant populations, the share of “Muslim extremists” identified in the study as the perpetrators of insults and other antisemitic acts against Jews was above 50 percent in Belgium, France, Sweden and the UK, and reached nearly half in Germany.

So it seems that French prime minister Manuel Valls is absolutely right when he acknowledges a new, normalized antisemitism that blends “the Palestinian cause, jihadism, the devastation of Israel, and hatred of France and its values.”[20]

Adding to these results are the cases of three terrible murders which have shocked Europe, as listed in The Guardian [21]:


In 2006, 23-year-old Ilan Halimi was kidnapped, tortured and left for dead in Paris by a group calling itself the Barbarians Gang, who subsequently admitted targeting him “because he was a Jew, so his family would have money.”

In May 2012, Toulouse gunman Mohamed Merah shot dead seven people, including three children and a young rabbi outside their Jewish school.

In May 2014, Mehdi Nemmouche, a French citizen of Algerian descent thought to have recently returned to France after a year in Syria fighting with radical Islamists, was charged with shooting four people at the Jewish museum in Brussels.


Researchers investigating the trajectory of antisemitism and “Anti-Zionism” will have already noted the continuity and extension of important elements of European antisemitism, especially that of the 19th and early 20th centuries, in many countries of the Arab and the Muslim world.  Such elements include the various editions of the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion.[22] But surprisingly enough, even research on the World Values Survey (WVS) project of the University of Michigan[23], now excludes in its global surveys the question item about the rejection of Jewish neighbors. This question, an important possible source for the comparative study of antisemitism, was included in the first five WVS “waves,” between 1981 and 2009, but is now notably absent from the questionnaire in its sixth and most recent wave of global interviews, from 2010-2014.[24]  Instead, the main thrust of WVS research on Muslim countries concentrates on gender issues. Norris and Inglehart say that “the most basic cultural fault line between the West and Islam, […] concerns the issues of gender equality and sexual liberalization. The cultural gulf separating Islam from the West involves Eros far more than Demos.”[25]




In light of the prior lack of empirical research on global antisemitism, particularly including in the Arab and the Muslim world, the new data provided by the ADL are all the more necessary and welcome, and become a valuable source for further (secondary) statistical reflection.  This survey researched attitudes and opinions toward Jews in more than 100 countries around the world. Parameters of the survey included:


Sample size

53,100 total interviews among citizens aged 18 and over across 101 countries and the Palestinian Territories in the West Bank & Gaza.


Sampling error

Between +/- 4.4% and +/- 3.2%.


Sampling methodology

All respondents were selected at random, based on random-digit dial sampling; with geographically stratified, randomly-selected sampling points in each country and at the household level. Telephone interviewing was only conducted in countries where the combined telephone density exceeded 90%. Samples were adapted to the landline and mobile phone density in the total population.


Representative samples at the national level

In an overwhelming majority of the countries and territories, the samples are fully nationally representative. In some countries (China, India, Ghana, Indonesia, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Laos, Malaysia, Mauritius, Uganda, and Vietnam), national coverage was not complete. Even there, sampling points were selected and the data was weighted to ensure the interviews from those countries reflected the national perspective.


Time of the interviews

Between July 2013 and February 2014.


Fieldwork and data collection

Conducted and coordinated by Anzalone Liszt Grove Research.


Data weighting

For demographic measures, including age, gender, religion, urban/rural location, ethnicity, and language. For regional and global averages, the data was weighted proportionately to the country’s adult population.


Index Scores and question wording

Created by asking whether the negative stereotypes (11 stereotypes) are “probably true” or “probably false.” Respondents who said at least 6 out of 11 statements are “probably true” are considered to hold antisemitic attitudes.

The negative stereotypes given were:


1) Jews are more loyal to Israel than to [this country/the countries they live in].

2) Jews have too much power in the business world.

3) Jews have too much power in international financial markets.

4) Jews don’t care about what happens to anyone but their own kind.

5) Jews have too much control over global affairs.

6) People hate Jews because of the way Jews behave.

7) Jews think they are better than other people.

8) Jews have too much control over the United States government.

9) Jews have too much control over the global media.

10) Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust.

11) Jews are responsible for most of the world’s wars.


Results:  How many antisemites world-wide?

The overall ADL GLOBAL 100 Index Score is 26 percent.  This reflects the percentage of global respondents who say that at least 6 of the 11 negative stereotypes tested are “probably true.” This indicates that there are over 1 billion (1000 million) antisemites around the globe.


Results:  By global region

In the world regions, the results are as follows (weighted percentages):


Middle East & North Africa (MENA): 74%

Eastern Europe: 34%

Western Europe: 24%

Sub-Saharan Africa: 23%

Asia: 22%

Americas: 19%

Oceania: 14%


The 26 percent of global population with antisemitic attitudes adds up to 1.09 billion people. The ADL also ran extra questions regarding awareness about the Shoah [Holocaust]. Only 33 percent of the global population today are aware of the Shoah and believe it has been accurately described by history.  In the Americas, this percentage is 55 percent, in Western Europe, it is 77 percent, in Eastern Europe it is 57 percent, in Asia it is 23 percent, in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is 12 percent, in Oceania it is 82 percent.  Notably, in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa), it is only 8 percent.

The interplay between religion, place of residence and antisemitism reveals interesting patterns as well.  While fewer than 20 percent of Christians in the Americas and Oceania are antisemitic, the share of Christians with antisemitic attitudes in Western Europe is 25 percent, in Eastern Europe it is 35 percent, and in the MENA region, it has reached a staggering 64 percent. The data for Muslims in these regions follow a similar pattern: while fewer than 30 percent of Muslims in the Americas and Oceania are antisemitic, the share of Muslims with antisemitic attitudes in Western Europe is 29 percent, in Eastern Europe it is only 20 percent, while in the MENA region, it is 75 percent. The following table summarizes each country’s rankings based on the original ADL data:




Table 1: Global antisemitism according to the ADL (in increasing order)

Country ADL 100:Percentage of population holding antisemitic views
Laos 0.20
Philippines 3.00
Sweden 4.00
Netherlands 5.00
Vietnam 6.00
United Kingdom 8.00
Denmark 9.00
United States 9.00
Tanzania 12.00
Czech Republic 13.00
Thailand 13.00
Australia 14.00
Canada 14.00
New Zealand 14.00
Finland 15.00
Ghana 15.00
Norway 15.00
Brazil 16.00
Iceland 16.00
Nigeria 16.00
Singapore 16.00
Uganda 16.00
Jamaica 18.00
China 20.00
India 20.00
Ireland 20.00
Italy 20.00
Portugal 21.00
Cote d’Ivoire 22.00
Estonia 22.00
Japan 23.00
Argentina 24.00
Mexico 24.00
Trinidad and Tobago 24.00
Haiti 26.00
Mongolia 26.00
Switzerland 26.00
Belgium 27.00
Germany 27.00
Slovenia 27.00
Austria 28.00
Latvia 28.00
Montenegro 29.00
Spain 29.00
Bolivia 30.00
Moldova 30.00
Russia 30.00
Venezuela 30.00
Bangladesh 32.00
Bosnia / Herzegovina 32.00
Costa Rica 32.00
Georgia 32.00
Kazakhstan 32.00
Botswana 33.00
Croatia 33.00
Uruguay 33.00
Nicaragua 34.00
Cameroon 35.00
Kenya 35.00
Paraguay 35.00
Romania 35.00
Guatemala 36.00
Lithuania 36.00
Azerbaijan 37.00
Chile 37.00
France 37.00
Belarus 38.00
Peru 38.00
South Africa 38.00
Ukraine 38.00
Colombia 41.00
Dominican Republic 41.00
Hungary 41.00
Serbia 42.00
Bulgaria 44.00
Mauritius 44.00
Poland 45.00
Indonesia 48.00
Panama 52.00
Korea, South 53.00
Senegal 53.00
Iran 56.00
Armenia 58.00
Malaysia 61.00
Greece 69.00
Turkey 69.00
Saudi Arabia 74.00
Egypt 75.00
Oman 76.00
Lebanon 78.00
Morocco 80.00
Qatar 80.00
United Arab Emirates 80.00
Bahrain 81.00
Jordan 81.00
Kuwait 82.00
Tunisia 86.00
Algeria 87.00
Libya 87.00
Yemen 88.00
Iraq 92.00



Maps 2 and 3, on the following pages, highlight the results of Table 1 at a glance, underlining the geographical shift of the global structure of antisemitism away from the Atlantic and Pacific arena towards the countries of the Middle East and North Africa.


Map 1: The ADL 100 Index of antisemitism




Map 2: World ranks in overcoming antisemitism




With these results on the table, our research now began attempting to identify, in a second and preliminary step, some of the “drivers” of the structures of global antisemitism. Although the background variables from the ADL questionnaire and their original data certainly merit a far-reaching secondary analysis, which could yield very promising results, this also would be rather time-consuming.  Thus, we decided to first run preliminary tests of the country aggregate results, presented in Table 1, in relationship to country structural background variables, other country aggregate survey results and established aggregate global value comparisons from internationally recognized sources and research traditions. Such tests of the statistical relationships of antisemitism with other variables on the aggregate national level, admittedly a second best solution, have still yielded sufficiently promising results to pave the way for future comparative study of global antisemitism, and might also indicate potential research paths to follow.

We tested the data using partial correlation coefficients and standard multiple regressions analyses, using the standard statistical software package IBM/SPSS XXI. [26] Since we made all our statistical materials freely available internationally both as Excel files and Excel choropleth maps, the results of our analysis are now essential in the public domain: anyone, anywhere around the globe, can check our results and draw corresponding maps.[27]

In all quantitative calculations, we allow for the important fact that some very poor countries, comparable in their GDP per capita with many Muslim and or Arab countries, show a very low level of antisemitism, and that antisemitism reaches its global climax in countries with middle income levels. Most modern global indicators of xenophobia and racism also exhibit such an inverted U shape in relation to GDP per capita. [28] This inverted U-shaped curve, so well-known from other indicators in the social sciences, also unfortunately applies to the phenomenon of global antisemitism. Countries transitioning from rural to urban societies are most prone to such phenomena as inequality, xenophobia and racism.

Shown below, Graph 1 and Maps 3 and 4 depict this significant phenomenon visually. Very poor societies are likely to exhibit a level of antisemitism of around 10 percent of the population, rising to above 40% at middle income levels, and leveling off somewhere near 20 percent at high income levels. Although the phenomenon of strong anti-Semitism in middle-income countries (as seen in Graph 1) explains only some 11 percent of the variance of antisemitism, it is significant in further quantitative analyses. Global rankings of how societies could avoid antisemitism, irrespective of the development level (i.e. using the mathematical function from Graph 1), reveal (Map 4) that while Sweden, Brazil, the Czech Republic, China, India, and several countries in Indo-China, among others, emerge as shining examples of tolerance towards Jews, it also presents problematic developments in the MENA-region as well as in some European countries (Greece, France, and Turkey), along with Iran, Indonesia and South Korea.



Graph 1: Antisemitism and development level of a country



Map 3: Global map of antisemitism, taking development levels into account


Map 4: Global rankings of societies-Strength of antisemitism irrespective of development levels

The data used here to produce a preliminary inventory of variables with a robust statistical and theoretically relevant relationship with antisemitism and which might be very promising for future comparative research on the subject, are structured as follows:


Structural background variables:

Variables which might contribute to our understanding of the drivers of antisemitism on a global scale. [29] These background data were chosen from an array of standard; cross-national comparative social sciences today (see results in Table 2 and Table 3; only significant and theoretically relevant results were listed). The chosen predictor variables correspond to a variety of theories, and are also used today to explain other phenomena, such as economic growth, and patterns of social or political development. Theories include modernization theories, dependency and world system theories, neo-liberal approaches, etc. These predictors are on record to be statistically highly related with other processes of socio-economic development as well. As expected, only a very limited number of those indicators have any statistically significant and theoretically meaningful relationship with antisemitism (see results in Table 2 and Table 3). The relevant, significant predictors were weeded out by running stepwise regression analyses (Table 2) and partial correlation analyses, where the function portrayed in Graph 1 was kept constant.


PEW data[30]:

Some of these international opinion data were presented at length in a recent article on the pages of this journal.[31] They highlight such phenomena as global support for politicians, including radical opponents of the State of Israel, like Iranian former President Ahmadinejad, or global Muslim opinions on religion and politics. (See results in Table 3; only significant and theoretically relevant results were listed.)


Arab Opinion Index (AOI) data[32]:

These Arab opinion data cover more than 4/5 of the population of the Arab world, and similarly, have been presented on the pages of this journal recently.[33] They provide very detailed insights into the structures of opinions in the countries of the Arab League (see results in Table 3). The dummy variable “membership in the Arab League” (i.e. 0 for non-membership; 1 for membership) also emerges as a significant predictor of antisemitism at the national level. Again, only significant and theoretically relevant results were listed.


WVS wave 6 data[34]:

These data, released in summer 2014, are a unique collection of global opinion, following a standardized questionnaire which has remained basically the same since the 1980s. The latest wave includes 52 countries, including Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) member countries Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Tunisia, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. The survey also includes large Muslim populations in such countries as China and Russia. The chosen WVS indicators and their aggregated subcomponents all correspond to dimensions of mass support for an open society. (See results in Table 3; only significant and theoretically relevant results were listed.)


Established global value comparisons:

Comparisons based on the research of Hofstede, [35] Inglehart, [36] and Schwartz[37]:  These established value surveys allow us to compare antisemitism with 15 aggregated value dimensions, hitherto dominating the field of quantitative global value comparisons (see the few significant results in Table 3). The 15 aggregate value dimensions may be considered the essence of what contemporary sociological research has to say on the mapping of global values. [38]




The structural background variables, the PEW data, the AOI data, and the WVS wave 6 data do not need further explanations here. But we should focus briefly on the global maps of human values, including racism and xenophobia, which were designed by sociological research and psychological research over recent decades. Since readers of this journal may not be familiar with these maps, a short explanation will be provided.

These most prominent international attempts to define and measure the development of human values in international social science have been, to date:

  • Hofstede’s theory of global values
  • The Schwartz/Davidov approach
  • Inglehart and associates’ studies of world values


Geert Hofstede, a Dutch psychologist, along with his associates, really established the field of comparative international value research[39]  Hofstede defines these dimensions of national culture as:

  • Power Distance
  • Individualism vs. Collectivism
  • Masculinity versus Femininity
  • Uncertainty Avoidance Index
  • Long-Term Orientation
  • Indulgence versus Restraint[40]


In the 2010 third edition of Hofstede’s book Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind, scores on the dimensions are listed for 76 countries.[41] But the Hofstede dimensions, relevant as they may be, are not strongly correlated with the ADL-100 antisemitism indicator, so we can presume that his dimensions do not offer important clues to the study of this phenomenon.

The next theory which we will briefly present here was developed by Shalom Schwartz, an Israeli psychologist and Professor at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. It was further developed in mathematical-statistical and theoretical terms by Eldad Davidov.[42] Schwartz began his investigations not on generalized surveys of the total population but on relatively small global samples of schoolteachers and college students. Participants were 80 samples of schoolteachers (K-12) from 58 national groups and 115 samples of college students from 64 national groups, together constituting 67 nations and 70 different cultural groups. Samples from ethnically heterogeneous nations came from the dominant, majority group. Most samples only included some 180 to 280 respondents. At a later stage, Schwartz validated his scales with survey data from the European Social Survey.[43]

Schwartz presented analyses of data from up to 73 countries, validating seven basic cultural orientations and the structure of interrelations among them: West European, English-speaking, Latin American, East European, and South Asian, Confucian-influenced, and African and Middle Eastern.

The seven dimensions identified by Schwartz are

  • Embeddedness
  • Hierarchy
  • Mastery
  • Affective Autonomy
  • Intellectual Autonomy
  • Egalitarianism
  • Harmony[44]


Muslim societies, according to Schwartz, rank very high on values of embeddedness. Embeddedness includes such values as social order, respect for tradition, forgiveness, moderation, obedience, politeness, cleanliness, national security, devoutness, wisdom, self-discipline, family security, honor towards elders, and reciprocation of favors. According to Schwartz, in cultures with an emphasis on embeddedness, people are viewed as entities embedded in the collective. Meaning in life comes largely through social relationships, through identifying with the group, participating in its shared way of life, and striving toward its shared goals. As he writes in A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations:  “Embedded cultures emphasize maintaining the status quo and restraining actions that might disrupt in-group solidarity or the traditional order. Important values in such cultures are social order, respect for tradition, security, obedience, and wisdom.”[45]

American sociologist Ronald F. Inglehart, of the University of Michigan, who pioneered comparative public opinion research during the last four decades, developed by contrast an interpretation of global values change which rests on a well-known two-dimensional scale of global values and global value change. It is based on the statistical technique of factor analysis of up to over twenty key WVS variables from more than 900 original survey items in the WVS.[46] The two Inglehart dimensions are:

  • The Traditional/ Secular-Rational dimension and
  • The Survival/Self-expression dimension.


According to Inglehart and Baker, 2000, societies that emphasize survival values show relatively low levels of subjective well-being, reported health, interpersonal trust, tolerance of outside groups, support for gender equality and environmental activism.  These societies tend to emphasize materialist values, have relatively high levels of faith in science and favor authoritarian government. Societies high on self-expression values tend to have the opposite preferences in these areas.[47]

The Inglehart dimensions are based upon WVS data from at least 145,000 interviewees around the globe.[48] For Inglehart and his associates, the rise of rational/secular values is an important element in socioeconomic and democratic development. Self-expression values, as opposed to survival values, give high priority to environmental protection, tolerance of diversity and rising demands for participation in decision making in economic and political life. These dimensions show a dramatic shift in child-rearing values, from emphasis on hard work toward emphasis on imagination and tolerance as important values to teach a child in the course of socio-economic development. Societies that rank high on self-expression values also tend to rank high on interpersonal trust.

As previously mentioned, we have made all our data used in this study publicly available. Our files are Microsoft Excel 2010 files, which can be easily imported into other statistical data analysis programs. We also provide our readers with choropleth maps of the 189 variables used in this study.[49] One of our files also lists the entire literature used in the data collection and interpretation. [50]


Variables 1-84 are international standard macro-quantitative country-level background variables, which might have an influence on the extent of antisemitism and mass support for Islamism.

Variables 85-113 summarize the most recently available PEW research data on Islamism and global Muslim opinions.

Variable 114 provides country values corresponding to the Effective Democracy Index, developed by Inglehart and associates. [51]

Variables 115-145 list country results from the AOI, while variable 146 represents a country’s membership in the Arab League.

Variables 147-151 are our compilations from the ADL-100 Index and our secondary calculations about the index.

Variables 152-173 evaluate new data from WVS wave 6. Our calculations aim to provide data on open societies and the mass support an open society receives internationally. We provide indices, projecting the mean responses from the WVS questions onto an UNDP type index, ranging from 0 (worst value) to 1 (best performance).

Variables 174-170 present the indices of global values according to Hofstede’s research; variables 180 and 181 are the two leading indicators from Inglehart’s WVS research; Variable 182 again lists the effective democracy index (to enable readers to run immediate Microsoft Excel calculations of effective democracy with the contiguous variables 174-189), and variables 183-189 portray the indicators developed by Schwartz. All these variables are available both as Microsoft Excel raw data and as choropleth global world maps.




With all the cards on the table, our results can be presented quickly and efficiently. Table 2 presents our multiple regression results of the determinants of antisemitism today.  Apart from the highly significant curvilinear function already presented in Graph 1, which shows that with rising development levels, antisemitism first rises and only later, begins to fall, our highly statistically significant equation (which explains 3/4 of global antisemitism) points to membership in the Arab League as by far the other, most significant driver of global antisemitism today. Muslim population shares also significantly influence the level of antisemitism in a country. Membership in the OIC, by contrast, cannot necessarily be considered as a driver of antisemitism; its statistical influence is even negative (but not significant). Table 1 also highlights another rather alarming connection: with all other factors being equal, the economic crisis in the countries of the European Monetary Union may, in future analyses, also emerge as one of the drivers of antisemitism, although currently the influence is significant only at the 9.7 percent level (and not at the usual 5 percent error probability level).


Table 2: Multiple regression results-Drivers of antisemitism, worldwide


  Unstandardized regression coefficient Standard error Standardized regression coefficient Beta t-test Error probability
Constant -379,034 86,997 -4,357 0,000
ln GDP per capita 94,223 20,028 4,230 4,705 0,000
ln GDP per capita ^2 -5,403 1,143 -4,290 -4,727 0,000
Membership in the OIC -1,659 7,385 -0,032 -0,225 0,823
Muslim population share per total population 0,225 0,100 0,360 2,259 0,026
Years of EMU membership, 2010 0,938 0,560 0,104 1,677 0,097
Arab League Membership 34,775 5,517 0,532 6,304 0,000

adj. R^2 = 73.8%; F = 45.596; n = 96 countries with complete data; error p = .000


A careful look at the residuals from this equation (see also Map 5) also tells us which 14 countries are characterized by antisemitism rates of 10 percent above the expected level, suggested by the multiple regression of Table 2. These are the countries where special care by the political leadership should be taken to redress the balance and to avoid future failures. In Europe, EU-members/candidates Greece, Turkey, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria all call for special attention according to this analysis, and should monitored regularly by the Brussels authorities.


  • Greece
  • Korea, South
  • Armenia
  • Yemen
  • Panama
  • Malaysia
  • Kenya
  • Turkey
  • Poland
  • Bolivia
  • Hungary
  • Bulgaria
  • Mauritius
  • Senegal


The following 18 countries are 10 percent or more below the antisemitism scores, predicted by the regression of Table 2. This suggests that their civil societies and/or their governments, together with civil society, have avoided the phenomenon of antisemitism, irrespective of the structural characteristics of the country, summarized in Table 1. Within Europe, this includes countries such as the Netherlands, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Finland, UK and Portugal. The BRICS countries Brazil, China and India are also noteworthy. Future research should also focus on the question of whether Muslims in such countries as China, Egypt, India, Malaysia, Nigeria, the Philippines, and Thailand have lower or higher scores of antisemitism than people from other religious denominations in those countries or people without any religious denomination.


  • Philippines
  • Laos
  • Vietnam
  • Netherlands
  • Thailand
  • Sweden
  • Ghana
  • Brazil
  • Azerbaijan
  • Jamaica
  • China
  • India
  • Czech Republic
  • Finland
  • United Kingdom
  • Portugal
  • Nigeria
  • Egypt


Table 3 informs us about the other drivers of antisemitism as they emerge from our research. Let us first start with the following structural background variables:  membership in the Arab League, Muslim population share, and membership in the Islamic Cooperation all have a statistically highly significant and strong partial correlation with the levels of antisemitism. The UNDP’s Gender Empowerment Index and the World Economic Forum’s closing of the gender gap score are all very negatively connected with antisemitism, independent of the development level of a country. That female emancipation is positively related to a country’s resistance to the phenomenon of antisemitism is also highlighted by the relatively high positive partial correlation between annual population growth and antisemitism. Other development and policy indicators like human rights, overall levels of development (based on a combined 35-variable indicator) and the level of overall tolerance in society for foreign workers, people of different racial origin, and others, influence the this measure in a predictable fashion. A real blow to ideologies of the multicultural society is the fact, however, that the foreign-born population share pushes up antisemitism scores, and explains more than 25 percent of the ADL-scores, even when keeping development levels constant. This powerful statistical relationship will hopefully contribute to creating a new immigration debate in developed Western democracies, where tendencies for an intolerant and antisemitic parallel society have been all too often neglected in recent years.

The Kaplan/Small study of antisemitism in Europe, to which we referred to above,[52] also receives qualified support from our results. Among the variables of the AOI and the PEW data, already presented on the pages of this journal, one of the highest partial correlations of antisemitism is with the percentage of the population who oppose the recognition of the State of Israel.  This demonstrates that, as critics of the ideology of “Anti-Zionism” have said all along, i.e. that Anti-Zionism is in reality antisemitism, is again proven by the statistical results of this study. Also other opinion structures, usually connected with religious fundamentalism (“religious authorities must interpret the laws”), social traditionalism (gender bias in being uncomfortable with a religiously mixed marriage), extreme dissatisfaction with the economic conditions, and rejection of the West’s anti-terrorism efforts highly correlate with antisemitism.

Finally, we should mention the relationships between combined scores for global value development and antisemitism. The only partial correlation relationships to be observed were the four numerically positive correlations with the Schwartz variables Embeddedness, Hierarchy, Harmony and Mastery, and the negative partial correlation with the Inglehart dimension Survival/Self-Expression values.

Map 5: Residuals from the main antisemitism equation


Table 3: Summary, quantitative estimates re significant drivers of antisemitism, worldwide, independent of a society’s development level


Data source Variable with a high and significant partial correlation with antisemitism partial correlation Error probability (two-tailed) Degrees of freedom R^2
Arab Opinion Index data %against recognition of Israel 0,860 0,028 4 73,960
Arab Opinion Index data Country member of the Arab league 0,814 0,000 93 66,260
Tausch/Heshmati/Brand structural variables Muslim population share per total population 0,774 0,000 93 59,908
Schwartz Embeddedness 0,732 0,000 40 53,582
Tausch/Heshmati/Brand structural variables Membership in the Islamic Cooperation 0,701 0,000 93 49,140
PEW data gender bias being uncomfortable with religiously mixed marriage 0,699 0,011 10 48,860
PEW data % favor Iran acquiring nuclear weapons 0,638 0,000 33 40,704
Schwartz Hierarchy 0,593 0,000 40 35,165
Schwartz Harmony 0,558 0,000 40 31,136
Tausch/Heshmati/Brand structural variables Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 (%) 0,525 0,000 92 27,563
Tausch/Heshmati/Brand structural variables Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%) 0,523 0,000 93 27,353
Tausch/Heshmati/Brand structural variables Civil and Political Liberties violations 0,516 0,000 93 26,626
Schwartz Mastery 0,504 0,001 40 25,402
Tausch/Heshmati/Brand structural variables military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) 0,503 0,000 92 25,301
Inglehart Survival/Self-Expression values -0,534 0,000 52 28,516
PEW data % Support for U.S.-led anti-terrorism efforts (PEW International, data for 2007 or nearest year) -0,547 0,000 42 29,921
Tausch/Heshmati/Brand structural variables overall 35 development index -0,598 0,000 93 35,760
World Values Survey 6 dissent with the opinion: University is more important for a boy than for a girl -0,617 0,000 39 38,069
Tausch/Heshmati/Brand structural variables LFPR 55-59 (Labor Force Participation Rate of Elderly Workers) -0,651 0,000 93 42,380
Tausch/Heshmati/Brand structural variables overall 35 development index, based on 7 dimensions -0,659 0,000 85 43,428
Tausch/Heshmati/Brand structural variables Global tolerance index -0,784 0,000 58 61,466
Tausch/Heshmati/Brand structural variables closing of global gender gap overall score 2009 -0,798 0,000 87 63,680
World Values Survey 6 dissent with the opinion: Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws. -0,849 0,000 39 72,080
Arab Opinion Index data %satisfied/very satisfied with economic conditions -0,887 0,018 4 78,677
Tausch/Heshmati/Brand structural variables gender empowerment index value -0,945 0,000 57 89,303



Our results seem to indicate that the future trajectory of antisemitism will inexorably shift further towards the axis of the current Middle East conflict and the dual hatred of the State of Israel and of Jews. They also indicate that future waves of the WVS project would do well to include items from the ADL 100 survey into their own analyses.

These results also underscore several alarming conclusions about the alarming rates of global antisemitism revealed by the recent ADL-100 study. Although the lower development levels of many Muslim and Arab countries might be mentioned to excuse the fact that there is so much antisemitism in that part of the world, membership in the Arab League and Muslim population shares wield significant influence on the level of antisemitism in a country. Our results also highlight the alarming connection that immigration and the economic crisis in the EU can also be considered one of the main drivers of contemporary antisemitism.

In particular, certain EU members/candidates Greece, Turkey, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria need special attention due to their exceptionally high antisemitism levels, considering the determinants mentioned in Table 1. On the positive side, the Netherlands, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Finland, the UK and Portugal, with their relatively low levels of antisemitism, along with the BRICS countries Brazil, China and India are noteworthy cases for their low levels of antisemitism.

*Arno Tausch is Associate Professor of Economics at Corvinus University Budapest, Hungary, and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Innsbruck University, Austria. He is author of, among other books, What 1.3 Billion Muslims Really Think: An Answer to a Recent Gallup Study, Based on the ‘World Values Survey. (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2009).




[3] All downloads in this article: September 12, 2014.

[4] Looking back on almost two millennia of Christian antisemitism, it would simply not be corresponding to historical facts to portray antisemitism as something “inherent” in “Muslim culture”. We should make clear at the outset of this article that there is a vast scholarship on the ups and downs in the relationship between Judaism and Islam, and on the history of Jews in the Muslim world, see, among others: Lewis, Bernard 1984. “The Jews of Islam”. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. For an authoritative summary about this pivotal issue, often overlooked in the contemporary debate, especially in Europe, see also Friedmann, Yohanan, Moshe Perlmann, and Haïm Z’ew Hirschberg. “Islam.” Encyclopedia Judaica. Ed. Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik. 2nd ed. Vol. 10. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2007. 87-98. Gale Virtual Reference Library. Web. 12 Sept. 2014. As Professor Bernard Lewis underlined already in his article 1998 article “Muslim Anti-Semitism”, Middle East Quarterly, (5), 2, June 1998: 43-49 (available at: “European anti-Semitism, in both its theological and racist versions, was essentially alien to Islamic traditions, culture, and modes of thought. But to an astonishing degree, the ideas, the literature, even the crudest inventions of the Nazis and their predecessors have been internalized and Islamized. The major themes-poisoning the wells, the invented Talmud quotations, ritual murder, the hatred of mankind, the Masonic and other conspiracy theories, taking over the world-remain”. And with a note of optimism, Professor Lewis added in that very same article as well: “The peace treaties [i.e. between Israel and some Arab countries] […] negotiated and signed between governments will remain cold and formal, amounting to little more than a cessation of hostilities, until peace is made between peoples. As long as a high-pitched scream of rage and hate remains the normal form of communication, such a peace is unlikely to make much progress. But there are some signs of improvement, of the beginnings of a dialogue. Statesmen, soldiers and businessmen have been in touch with their Israeli opposite numbers, and some of these contacts have so far survived the change of government in Israel. Intellectuals have proved more recalcitrant, but even among them, there have been signs of change. A few courageous souls have braved the denunciation of their more obdurate colleagues to meet publicly with Israelis and even on rare occasions to visit Israel. A number of Arab intellectuals have expressed disquiet and distaste with the vicious anti-Semitism that colors so much of the debate on the Arab-Israel conflict.”




[8] President Erdogan would do well to reflect instead on the shining example of Turkish hospitality towards the Sephardim from 1492 onwards; see Levy, Avigdor 1992. The Sephardim in the Ottoman Empire. Princeton, N.J.: Darwin Press and Shaw, Stanford J. 1993. The Jews of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, New York: New York University Press. During his tenure as Turkish ambassador in France, the Kemalist General Behic Erkin (1876-1961) saved thousands of Jews. See Shaw, Stanford J. 1993. Turkey and the Holocaust: Turkey’s Role in Rescuing Turkish and European Jewry from Nazi Persecution, 1933-1945. New York: New York University Press; London, MacMillan Press.


[10]See also: and

[11] For an excellent survey of the vast and growing literature on humanistic and enlightened perspectives on Islamic theology, see, among others, Troll, Christian 2005. Progressive Thinking in Contemporary Islam. Conference of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and the Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, September 22-24, 2005, Frankfurt a. M., available at After all, the Second Vatican Council in the Roman Catholic Church, which proved to be a watershed in Catholic views on Judaism, was preceded by several decades of a very thorough theological rethinking of the foundations of the Christian faith by leading theologians; see also Bea, Augustin, 1966. The church and the Jewish people; a commentary on the Second Vatican Council’s Declaration on the relation of the Church to non-Christian religions. New York: Harper & Row. The role of this Jesuit father and later Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church in overcoming the two millennia of antisemitism cannot be underestimated. For that reason, the present author distances himself from very notable tendencies, especially in the European press nowadays, to blame “Islam as such” (“der Islam an sich”) for antisemitism and hatred of Jews. These tendencies are to be found, among others, in the article by Christian Ortner in the Vienna daily “Die Presse”, June 13, 2014, available at On the political level, The President of the Czech Republic, Milos Zeman gave prominence to this argument by saying that “Islam” “as such” is to blame for the Brussels Jewish Museum murders (see, among others: By contrast, for a highly interesting Jewish perspective on the positive role of the Torah and Jewish traditions in the Quran, see Bar-Zeev, Hai. 2005. Une lecture juive du Coran. Paris: Berg International. On the more than 40 Quranic verses mentioning “Israel”, see also Hadi Palazzi, Abdul 1997. The Jewish-Moslem dialogue and the question of Jerusalem. Jerusalem: Institute of the World Jewish Congress and Hadi Palazzi, Abdul 2010. Allah Is a Zionist. The Quranic argument for Jewish sovereignty in the land of Israel. The Tablet, March 18, 2010, available at



[14] Kaplan, E. H. and Small, C. A. 2006. Anti-Israel sentiment predicts antisemitism in Europe. Journal of Conflict Resolution, (50), 4: 548-561, DOI: 10.1177/0022002706289184.

[15] Jacobs, D. et al. 2011. The impact of the conflict in Gaza on antisemitism in Belgium. Patterns of Prejudice, (45), 4: 341-360, DOI: 10.1080/0031322X.2011.605845.

[16] Frisch M. (translator: Michael Bullock) 1952/1962. The fire raisers: a morality without a moral, with an afterpiece: a play. London: Methuen.


[18] See and




[22] For an excellent survey of this vast literature, see Heinemann, Joseph, et al. “Antisemitism.” Encyclopaedia Judaica. Ed. Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik. 2nd ed. Vol. 2. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2007. 206-246. Gale Virtual Reference Library. Web. 25 Aug. 2014.


[24] For Wave Five, this question was worded, “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors?”  The list included such groups as Muslims, Evangelists, Jews, along with many (non-religious) demographic options.  For Wave Six, the question item listed fewer items and again, made only non-religious distinctions, such as among immigrants, homosexuals, and “people of a different religion.”

[25] Norris P. and Inglehart R. 2002. Islamic culture and democracy: Testing the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis. Comparative Sociology, 1(3-4), 235-263, DOI: 10.1163/156913302100418592. See also the new survey of research on World Values Survey data: Tausch A., Heshmati A. and Karoui H. 2014. The Political Algebra of Global Value Change: General Models and Implications for the Muslim World. New York: Nova Science Publishers.

[26] Blalock H. M. 1972. Social statistics. New York: McGraw-Hill; IBM. 2011; Tabachnick B. G. and Fidell L. S. 2001. Using multivariate statistics. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon; IBM SPSS 2014. Statistics 20 Algorithms. Armonk, New York. (URL:

[27] EXCEL data and Choropleth maps of Islamism and antisemitism and their drivers at a cross-national level. Available at:

[28] See the calculations based on World Values Survey data in: Tausch A., Heshmati A. and Karoui H. 2014. The Political Algebra of Global Value Change: General Models and Implications for the Muslim World. New York: Nova Science Publishers (

[29] Tausch A., Almas Heshmati and Ulrich Brand. 2012. Globalization, the Human Condition and Sustainable Development in the 21st Century Cross-national Perspectives and European Implications. By Arno Tausch and Almas Heshmati with a Foreword by Ulrich Brand. London, New York and Delhi: Anthem Press.


[31] Tausch A. 2014. Further Insight into Global and Arab Muslim Opinion Structures: Statistical Reflections on the 2013 PEW Report “The World’s Muslims”. Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Spring 2014). Available at:

Tausch A. 2013. A look at recent international survey data about Arab opinion’ Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Fall 2013), 57-74; IDC Herzliya, Gloria Center, Israel.

[32] Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies Arab Opinion Index

[33] Tausch A. 2013. A look at recent international survey data about Arab opinion. Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Fall 2013), 57-74;, Gloria Center, IDC Herzliya, Israel.


[35] Our own compilation from:  and We only considered the countries with complete values for the final analysis.

[36] The downloadable IBM SPSS file, which we used in our research, is denominated in the WVS terminology as “wvs1981_2008_v20090914.sav”

[37] Schwartz S. H. 2009. Cultural Value Orientations: Nature & Implications of National Differences. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel Science Foundation Grant No. 921/02, available at and Ralston D. A., Egri C. P., Reynaud E. et al. 2011. A Twenty-First Century Assessment of Values Across the Global Workforce. Journal of Business Ethics, November 2011, Volume 104, Issue 1, pp 1-31.

[38] See the country values used by the different theories documented in: Tausch A., Heshmati A. and Karoui H. 2014. The Political Algebra of Global Value Change: General Models and Implications for the Muslim World. New York: Nova Science Publishers (

[39] Hofstede G., Hofstede G. J. and Minkov, M. 2010. Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind. Revised and expanded 3rd Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill.

[40] Our own compilation from:  and

[41] http: //www. geerthofstede. nl/dimensions-of-national-cultures

[42] Davidov E., Schmidt P. and Billiet J. 2011. Cross-cultural analysis: methods and applications. New York: Routledge.


[44] Schwartz S. H. 2006. A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications. Comparative Sociology, 5 (2): 137-182 and Schwartz S. H. 2009. Cultural Value Orientations: Nature & Implications of National Differences. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel Science Foundation Grant No. 921/02, available at

[45] Schwartz S. H. 2006. A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: Explication and Applications. Comparative Sociology, 5 (2): 137-182.

[46] Inglehart R. F. 2000. Globalization and Postmodern Values. The Washington Quarterly, 23 (1): 215-228; Inglehart R. F. 2002. Islam, Gender, Culture, and Democracy. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 43 (2-5): 224-28; Inglehart R. F. and Baker, W. E. 2000. Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values. American Sociological Review. 65 (1): 19-51 and Inglehart R. F. and Norris P. 2003. Rising tide: gender equality and cultural change around the world. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

[47] Inglehart R. F. and Baker, W. E. 2000. Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values. American Sociological Review. 65 (1): 19-51.

[48] http: //www. worldvaluessurvey. org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_54


[50] See the downloadable MICROSOFT EXCEL File PUB Public access antisemitism drivers EXCEL data 26 08 2014, Table 2

[51] Alexander, A. C. and Inglehart, R. and Welzel, C. 2011. Measuring Effective Democracy: A Defense (December 15, 2020). World Values Research, WVR Volume 4, Number 1, 2011. Available at SSRN: or

[52] Kaplan, E. H. and Small, C. A. 2006. Anti-Israel sentiment predicts antisemitism in Europe. Journal of Conflict Resolution, (50), 4: 548-561, DOI: 10.1177/0022002706289184.